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IN SITU GENETIC DIVERSITY
James K. Boyce
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Genetic diversity in crop plants is crucial for long-term world food security. This diversity is
sustained in the field primarily by poor farmers in developing countries, who receive no
compensation for providing this external benefit to humankind. When agricultural imports
displace local production in centers of genetic diversity, this threatens both rural livelihoods
and the continued provision of this external benefit. The North American Free Trade
Agreement’s impact on Mexican maize farming illustrates the problem. The prospects for
remedial policies are shaped by the distribution of the costs and benefits of action and
inaction.
1. INTRODUCTION
The economic case for trade liberalization rests on its capacity to extend the  much-
vaunted efficiencies of the free market. As trade barriers are lifted, producers are
expected to reallocate land, labor, and capital to those activities in which they wield a
comparative advantage, abandoning the production of other commodities which can
now be imported more cheaply. The result is a larger economic pie which in principle,
if seldom in practice, could benefit all concerned.
But with this extension of the market comes a corresponding extension of market
failures. Trade liberalization can exacerbate the inefficiencies which result from the
fact that external costs and benefits are not reflected in market prices. Say that country
A produces corn at a lower internal cost (and hence lower market price) than country
B, but in so doing generates larger external costs via pollution and natural resource
degradation. A shift of corn production to country A from
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country B, brought about by trade liberalization, will increase the magnitude of these
external costs. Conversely, if corn producers in country B generate external benefits
(that is, positive externalities) in the form of the conservation and evolution of crop
genetic diversity, then liberalization will decrease the magnitude of these benefits. In
both cases, the competitive advantage of corn producers in country A over those in
country B rests at least in part on the faulty accounting of the market.
Recent discussions of ‘environmental dumping’-trade at prices which fail to reflect
environmental impacts-have generally shared two limitations. First, they have focused
exclusively on negative externalities. Second, they have assumed that in trade between
developing countries (the ‘South’) and industrialized countries (the ‘North’), dumping
will flow from the former to the latter; that is, producers in the poor, backward South
will undercut producers in the more environmentally responsible North.
1
This essay focuses primarily, though not exclusively, on positive externalities which
are crucial for long-run world food security: the conservation and evolution of in situ
genetic diversity in crop plants. For reasons related to the historical origins of
humankind’s major food crops, this diversity is located primarily in the countries of the
South. In the absence of corrective policies, agricultural liberalization can lead to the
displacement of production in centers of diversity by low-priced imports from the
North. This exacerbates the genetic erosion which has already occurred with the spread
of ‘modern’ varieties in the South.
The essay is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses ecological distribution that is,
the distribution of the costs and benefits associated with environmental
externalities-and its implications for the political economy of policy-making. Section 3
provides an overview of the geographical distribution and importance of in situ genetic
diversity in major food crops. Section 4 illustrates the threat which agricultural
liberalization poses to this diversity with the case of Mexican maize under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Section 5 concludes with some reflections
on the prospects for remedial policies.
2. ECOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION AND THE
POWER-WEIGHTED SOCIAL DECISION RULE
Environmental externalities have distributional consequences. Some parties benefit
from negative externalities: by imposing external costs on others, they avoid
internalizing the costs of pollution control or natural resource conservation, in effect
receiving a subsidy from those who bear the external costs.2 Similarly, the fact that
those who produce positive externalities cannot internalize the benefits means that, in
effect, they pay a tax.Ecological distribution and genetic diversity  267
Conventional economic theory suggests that environmental policies-regulations,
fiscal incentives, and the creation of marketable instruments such as emission
permits-should be guided solely by the pursuit of efficiency, following the normative
rule of cost-benefit analysis:
where  bi = the  net benefit to the  ith  individual (and costs are counted as negative
benefits). That is, net benefits summed over all individual members of society should
be maximized, constrained of course by available resources.3 Benefits and costs are
denominated in monetary terms, and the fact that some people wield more purchasing
power than others gives them greater weight in cost-benefit calculations. But the
formula treats all individuals (or more precisely, all dollars) the same, in that a dollar
benefit (or cost) to one person counts exactly as much as a dollar benefit (or cost) to
any other.
Practice often departs from this normative theory. Environmental policies alter not
only the size of the economic welfare pie, but also its distribution. Social decisions
may accord greater weight to the benefits (or costs) of some people than to the
benefits (or costs) of others. If so, the outcomes can be described as following a
power-weighted social decision rule (PWSDR):
where  ? i  = the power of the  ith  individual. That is, social decisions maximize net
benefits weighted by the power of those who receive them. The PWSDR corresponds
to the cost-benefit rule only in the special case where all individuals are equally
powerful (Boyce, 1994).
Just as individual preferences-and the underlying utility functions of neoclassical
theory-are revealed by individual choice, so social preferences-and the underlying
distribution of power-are revealed by social choice. When the government intervenes
to remedy a market failure, we can infer that the power-weighted benefits of those
who gain from that intervention exceed the power-weighted costs of those who lose.
When the government does not remedy a market failure, we can infer that the
power-weighted costs of those who would lose from remedial policies exceed the
power-weighted benefits of those who would gain. More generally, the  extent  to
which the government intervenes (since intervention is not simply a binary yes-or-no
matter) will reflect the balance of power between winners and losers.
Ecological distribution is thus of interest not only because it captures an important,
and often neglected, dimension of the impact of environmental policy on human
well-being, but also because it sheds light on the distribution of power in society, and
thereby on the political economy of the policy-making process itself.268 JOURNAL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION Vol. 6 No. 2 (1996)
3. IN SITU GENETIC DIVERSITY
Genetic diversity in humankind’s major food crops underpins long-term world food
security by providing the raw material needed for future crop adaptations to changing
pests, pathogens, and environmental conditions. The erosion of this diversity is today a
cause for serious concern.
Modern agriculture is characterized by a much higher degree of varietal uniformity
than traditional agriculture. This uniformity facilitates high land productivity, but at the
same time it increases vulnerability to large-scale crop failures due to plant disease and
pest epidemics (NAS, 1972). In response to this genetic vulnerability, plant breeders
continually seek to incorporate genes for resistance to emerging pests and pathogens
into new varieties. The average life-span of a modern variety for many crops is today
less than a decade, after which the variety is replaced by new ones bred for resistance
to newly evolved threats. This ‘diversity through time’ offers a partial substitute for
diversity at any given point in time (Duvick, 1984).
The genetic raw material for this  varietal relay race comes from the diverse
traditional varieties bequeathed to us by earlier generations of farmers.
4 Concerns
about the erosion of this genetic diversity have arisen primarily in response to the
spread of modern ‘high-yielding’ (or more precisely, highly fertilizer-responsive)
varieties within the agriculture of developing countries. But international trade is a
second route by which modern varieties (in this case grown elsewhere) displace
traditional varieties.
3.1 Centers of Diversity
In the 1920s, the eminent Russian botanist N.I.  Vavilov identified the centers of
origin of the world’s principal food crops. He found a strong correlation between these
ancient centers of origin and modern centers of genetic diversity (see Figure 1). This
association is weaker in the case of crops such as wheat, which have a very long
history of geographical diffusion, but  Vavilov’s basic insight is today generally
accepted among plant scientists (Hawkes, 1983).
The centers of origin and diversity of the world’s major food crops are located in
developing countries. Rice originated in the eastern Indian subcontinent, with a
secondary center of diversity in north China. Wheat originated in the fertile crescent
spanning parts of present-day Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, with secondary centers in
Ethiopia and central Asia. Maize originated in what is now southern and central
Mexico and Guatemala. Potatoes originated on the Andean slopes of Peru.
Comprehensive data on the international distribution of genetic diversity do not
exist. A country-level indicator can be derived, however, from the seed samplesEcological distribution and genetic diversity 269
Figure 2. Centers of origin of the most important cultivated plants
Note: I. Southwestern Asia; II. Eastern Asia; III. the Mediterranean area; IV. Abyssinia and Egypt; V.
mountain areas of Mexico, Central America, and South America.
Source: Vavilov (1926/1992, p. 127).
held in the world’s most comprehensive international gene banks. The number of
accessions from a given country, divided by an acreage-based area measure, provides
an index of genetic diversity.
5 While not a perfect measure collections are uneven
across countries, and some accessions are duplicates-this index serves as a useful first
approximation of the geographical distribution of crop genetic diversity.
Table 1 presents data on accessions held at the maize gene bank at CIMMYT (the
International Center for Maize and Wheat Improvement) in Mexico, the leading
international center for maize research.  CIMMYT’s gene bank held 13,211 maize
accessions as of May 1995, of which Mexico accounted for 32%, the largest share of
any country. Among major maize-producing countries (with 500,000 hectares or more
annually sown to the crop in 1992-1994), Mexico ranks highest on the diversity index,
with a value more than one hundred times that of the United States.
Table 2 presents comparable data on accessions held at the rice gene bank at IRRI
(the International Rice Research Institute) in the Philippines, the leading international
center for rice research. IRRI’s gene bank held 80,894 accessions as of April 1996, of
which India accounted for 19%, the largest share of any country. Among major
rice-producing countries, India ranks highest on the diversity index.  A number of
other Asian countries also appear to have considerable genetic diversity in rice by this
measure.270 JOURNAL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION Vol. 6 No. 2 (1996)
The general picture emerging from the data in Tables 1 and 2 is thus consistent
with Vavilov’s principle as to the correlation between centers of origin and centers of
diversity.
3.2 In situ and ex situ Conservation: Complements, not Substitutes
In response to the long-term threat posed by genetic erosion, national and inter-
national agencies have collected and stored seed samples in ex situ (off-site)  germ-
plasm banks. These  ex situ collections give plant breeders ready access to genetic
diversity, and provide crucial insurance against losses of in situ (on-site, or in-the-
field) genetic diversity. However, they do not provide a satisfactory substitute for in
situ genetic diversity for three reasons.
First, gene banks are not completely secure. The seeds must be stored under
controlled temperature and humidity conditions, and periodically regenerated by
planting to harvest new seed (Roberts and Ellis, 1984). The world’s largest maize
germplasm collection is in what used to be called Leningrad; the second largest isEcological distribution and genetic diversity  271
in the capital of what remains of Yugoslavia ( Plucknett et al., 1987, p. 120). The
viability of the seeds in these collections is an open question. Even in relatively
wealthy and stable countries such as the United States, plant breeders often complain
of inadequate funding for seed collection maintenance from financially strapped
governments.
6 Irreplaceable material in gene banks has been lost due to human errors
and mechanical failures. At the International Center for the Improvement of Maize and
Wheat (CIMMYT) in Mexico, for example, maize collections from the 1940s have
been lost (Wade, 1974, p. 1187). ‘Back-up copies’ of Mexican maize varieties at the
U.S. National Seed Storage Laboratory in Fort Collins, Colorado, were also destroyed
(Raeburn, 1995, pp. 62-63).
Second, many genetic attributes can be ascertained only by growing the plants in
micro-habitats similar to those from which they originated. For example, the fact that a
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droughts at four-week intervals will not be apparent unless the plant is grown under
those specific conditions. The alternative of expressing such genetic attributes in
laboratory growth chambers is extremely costly.
Finally, even if it were possible to establish perfectly secure gene banks (which it is
not), these could store only the existing stock of genetic diversity at any point in time.
The ongoing process of evolution, which created this diversity and continues to
generate a flow of new varieties, cannot be stored; it can happen only in the field. Plant
breeders can develop new crosses from the existing stock, but they cannot replicate the
flow of new raw material from in situ evolution.
7
This is not to imply that gene banks are unimportant. On the contrary, their loss
would be catastrophic. The world needs more gene banks, better funding for them, and
greater investment in professional training for plant breeders whose knowledge is an
essential complement to the gene banks (Wilkes, 1992). Modern plant breeding has
played a central role in the tremendous growth in world food output in the past 50
years. And as recent experiences in war-torn Nicaragua and Cambodia have shown, in
situ biodiversity is also vulnerable to losses, in which case ex  situ collections can
provide crucial back-up copies (Plucknett et al., 1987, p. 94).
In sum, ex situ collections are necessary, but not sufficient. They are best regarded
as complements to in situ biodiversity, rather than as substitutes for it.
More than two decades ago, the botanist Hugh Iltis (1974) called for ‘the deliberate
and permanent preservation of selected specific local genetic landscapes, scientifically
justified, politically negotiated, and perhaps internationally subsidized.’ In a similar
vein, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences recently concluded that  in situ
conservation ‘may be particularly valuable for conserving landraces [traditional
varieties] in regions with crop diversity, thus allowing continued adaptation and
evolution’ (National Research Council, 1993, p. 128).
In situ  conservation of genetic diversity is not necessarily incompatible with
technological change. The adoption of high-yielding varieties and high-input
technology can and often does co-exist with on-going cultivation of traditional
varieties.
8 But in the absence of policies to encourage  in situ conservation, further
losses in genetic diversity are certain. Efforts to prevent these losses so far have been
very modest relative to needs (Wilkes, 1992). Mexican maize, now facing competition
from an influx of U.S. imports under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), is a case in point.
4. NAFTA AND MEXICAN MAIZE
Some 5,000 years ago, farmers in what is now Mexico domesticated maize
9 (see
Figure 2). In terms of its cumulative impact on human well-being, this surely ranks
among the great technological achievements of history. Over the millennia, maize
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the arrival of the Europeans it eventually spread across the globe, but central and
southern Mexico remained the center of genetic diversity in maize, consistent with
Vavilov’s principle. When scientists collected maize  germplasm in the 1940s and
1950s, they found an remarkable profusion of varieties in this region (see Figure 3).
4.1 Evolutionary Gardens
The campesinos of southern and central Mexico today grow approximately 5,000
different varieties of maize.
10  In a single village in Oaxaca, for example, researchers
Raul and Luis Garcia-Barrios (1990) found that peasants distinguished among 17
different environments in which they grew 26 different maize varieties.
Scientists refer to the Mexican  campesino  farmers' hilly,  rainfed maize plots as
‘evolutionary gardens,’ or ‘gardens of chaos’ (Wilkes, 1992, pp. 24-26). The
‘cultivated natural capital’ of crop varieties is complemented by the ‘natural capital’ of
the wild and weedy relatives of the crop species (Martinez-Alier, 1993, p. 110). Here
maize and its wild relative, teosinte, continue to evolve under the pressure of natural
selection. Introgression, back-and-forth hybridization between maize and  teosinte,
augments the evolutionary process. As the environment changes and as new strains of
insect pests and plant diseases evolve, the interaction between nature and human
purpose yields a stream of new varieties adapted to changing conditions. Mexico’s
campesinos thus not only maintain and reproduce a vast stock of maize varieties; they
also manage an ongoing evolutionary flow of new varieties.
4.2 Competition from the United States
Maize is today the leading crop in both Mexico and the United States. In the U.S. it
covers one-seventh of the arable land; in Mexico it covers nearly one-third. The U.S.,
with average yields of 7.4 metric tons per hectare ( mt/ha), produces roughly 200
million mt of maize each year on some 300,000 farms; Mexico, with average yields of
2.0 mt/ha, produces roughly 14 million mt on 2.7 million farms (see Table 3). Most
U.S. maize is used as animal feed; most Mexican maize is consumed directly by people
in the form of tortillas.
U.S. production techniques differ dramatically from those of the Mexican
campesinos. Six maize varieties account for almost half of the U.S. acreage; only a few
hundred, most of which are closely related, are available commercially. With much
area under few varieties, U.S. maize is genetically vulnerable to insect and disease
epidemics, as was dramatically illustrated when the southern corn leaf blight destroyed
one-fifth of the nation’s crop in 1970 (National Academy of Sciences, 1972; Walsh,
1981). To keep ahead of the rapidly evolving pests, plant breeders must release a
constant stream of new maize varieties. On average, commercialmaize varieties in the U.S. are replaced every seven years (Duvick, 1984, p. 164).
Ninety-six percent of U.S. maize acreage is treated with herbicides, and about
one-third with insecticides. Although comparable data are not available for Mexico,
usage there is lower, particularly amongst small farmers." The herbicides and
insecticides used on U.S. maize have contaminated groundwater supplies in a number
of states (see Table 4). A five-year survey conducted by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (1990) found that atrazine, the most widely used herbicide in corn
fields, was present in the water of one in every 60 community water systems and in
one in 140 private wells nationwide. Citing concerns as to human cancer risks and
effects on aquatic organisms, the Environmental Protection Agency (1994) launched a
Special Review of atrazine and two closely related herbicides, which could eventually
lead to restrictions or a total ban on their use.
By the standard of market prices, U.S. maize production is more ‘efficient’ than
Mexico’s.12 When NAFTA was negotiated, U.S. maize cost about $110 per ton at the
border, while in Mexico maize farmers received $240 per ton.13  The Mexican
government has long restricted maize imports to protect domestic growers. Under
NAFTA that protection is being phased out over a 15-year period. The controversial
nature of this measure, striking close to the heart of traditional Mexican culture,
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is reflected in the fact that this is the slowest phase-out of protection for any
commodity under the trade agreement.14
The price advantage of U.S. maize has four sources: (1) natural factors, notably
better soils, more regular rainfall, and a killing frost which reduces pest populations in
the U.S. corn belt; (2) farm subsidies which reduce the U.S. market price;
15 (3) the
exclusion of environmental costs such as groundwater contamination from market
prices, which is of greater importance in the U.S. where agrochemical use is more
intensive; and (4) the failure of market prices to capture the value of the maintenance
of genetic diversity by Mexican maize farmers.
4.3 The Displacement of Campesino Maize
NAFFA will not totally eliminate Mexican maize production. Large-scale Mexican
growers on the best soils, many of whom use U.S.-style production techniques
including commercial hybrid varieties, irrigation, and intensive agrochemical
applications, will be able to compete successfully; and very small-scale traditional
growers producing solely for their own household consumption might be less sensitive
to the market price (see Table 5).16 NAFTA is expected to result in the contraction of
Mexico’s maize acreage in coming years, however, as cheaper imported maize from
the U.S. displaces domestic production. This reflects a shift in Mexican government
policy which predated the signing of NAFTA: in December 1991 the Ministry of
Agriculture planned to reduce the country’s corn acreage by one-third by 1996 by
cutting subsidies and protection in the name of ‘modernization’ (Solis, 1991). In 1994,
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U.S. grain exports to Mexico increased by more than one-third (Browne, 1995, p. 2).
Estimates of the number of Mexican maize farmers who will eventually be dis-
placed by U.S. imports vary widely. Much of the abandoned maize land is likely to be
converted into cattle pastures, which require far less labor. Relatively conservative
estimates predict that hundreds of thousands of campesinos  will migrate to Mexican
cities (and perhaps to the U.S.) as a result. Upper-end predictions run as high as 15
million people including family members - one-sixth of the Mexican population.
17
The extent of  campesino  displacement in Mexico could be mitigated by gov-
ernment measures to support ‘modernization’ of maize production (that is, a shift
toward hybrids, irrigation, and higher use of purchased inputs) and diversification to
other crops (de Janvry, Sadoulet, and Gordillo de Anda, 1995).
18 Such support would
represent a marked departure from the recent trend toward cutbacks in marketing,
credit, and technical assistance services for Mexican farmers. Even if such a policy
reversal were forthcoming, these measures would not necessarily arrest the loss of in
situ genetic diversity in maize; indeed, they could accelerate it.
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Hours after NAFTA went into effect in January 1994, peasants in the southern
Mexican state of Chiapas launched the  Zapatista uprising, declaring that the trade
agreement represented a ‘death sentence’ for Mexico’s indigenous peoples (Fox,
1994; Perera, 1994). As the foregoing discussion suggests, Mexican campesinos  are
not the only parties who will be harmed by free trade in maize with the United
States-at prices uncorrected for environmental costs and benefits. In their efforts to
defend their livelihoods, Mexican maize farmers have potential allies among
environmentalists and others worldwide who recognize the importance of sustaining in
situ genetic diversity in this critical food crop. The prospects for appropriate policies
are likely to hinge on the mobilization of this support.278 JOURNAL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION Vol. 6 No. 2 (1996)
5.1 NAFTA and Maize: Winners and Losers
The impact of liberalization of the corn trade between Mexico and the United States
on ecological distribution arises from both positive and negative externalities. Positive
externalities, in the form of the conservation and evolution of in situ genetic diversity,
are generated south of the border, and benefit humankind at large. Negative
externalities, associated with intensive agrochemical use, are concentrated in the U.S.
(though they also arise in ‘modern’ Mexican maize farming). Under free trade-in the
absence of remedial policies-traditional Mexican growers will sell at prices which fail
to reflect the full social benefit of their production, while U.S. producers sell at prices
which fail to internalize environmental costs.
The principal winners and losers are depicted in Table 6. The main winners from
corn trade liberalization are the U.S. corn producers and grain traders, who gain a
substantial new market, and Mexican consumers who can now buy corn more cheaply.
The extent to which Mexican consumers will benefit from lower prices is complicated,
however, by the fact that many, particularly in urban areas, have long bought corn at
subsidized prices; hence the main effect may be to ease the fiscal burden of the
Mexican government. 
19
The most immediate losers are the Mexican corn producers, whose livelihoods are
undercut by cheap imports. The environmental impacts of corn production create two
further groups of losers: (i) future human generations worldwide, whose food security
will be diminished by the reduction of in situ genetic diversity in maize, and (ii) those
adversely affected by the agrochemical pollution resulting from increased U.S. corn
production.
It would be difficult to place monetary values on these externalities, but related
exercises suggest that the sums involved are large. The National Academy of Sciences
(1993, pp. 317-319) estimates the value of ex situ rice germplasm, simply in terms of
its contribution to modern ‘green revolution’ varieties, at roughly $400 million per
year, and states that calculations for maize give a similar result.
20 I know of no
attempts to calculate the economic value of  in situ  crop diversity, but if this is a
necessary complement to ex situ collections, as argued above, then such valuations
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With respect to pesticide use, Pimentel et al. (1992) estimate the external costs in
the United States at $8.1 billion/year, equivalent to more than 10% of the annual value
of U.S. crop production.
21 This estimate is incomplete in that it excludes water and soil
pollution, and omits possible human health effects such as cancer and sterility.
5.2 Prospects for Remedial Policies
The governments of the industrialized nations have long protected their farm
sectors with tariffs, quotas, and subsidies; agriculture is sometimes described as ‘the
world’s most protected industry.
22 The stated rationales for agricultural protection-the
safeguarding of employment, political stability, cultural values, national food
security-are probably at least as compelling in Mexico today as they ever were in the
United States, Europe, or Japan. In the case of Mexican maize, however, there is a
further powerful rationale for protection: the need to sustain genetic diversity in one of
humankind’s most important food crops.
In practice, trade policy is often shaped more by private interests than by the public
interest. Economists have long argued that the costs of trade protection to consumers
generally exceed the gains to producers. The balance of power between them is
invoked to explain the resilience of protectionism, as smaller numbers and larger per
capita effects confer a political advantage to producer interests.
23 Here too, one can
observe the operation of the power-weighted social decision rule.
If it could muster sufficient political will to do so, the Mexican government could
implement unilateral measures to protect campesino maize. Trade policy is among the
possible measures. Import restrictions ‘imposed for the protection of plants or animals,
including measures for protection against disease, degeneration or extinction’ have
been recognized as legitimate as far back as the 1946 Canada Mexico Trade Agreement
(Charnovitz, 1993, p. 10072).  While NAFTA rules out the imposition of
anti-dumping duties in response to differences in environmental standards, it contains
exception clauses derived from GATT which permit environmental measures
‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’ and ‘measures relating to
the conservation of living and non-living exhaustible resources.’
24
While ecological tariffs or other import restrictions on maize are a feasible response,
they are not first-best policies. In principle, a more efficient alternative would be
ecological subsidies: payments to Mexican maize farmers to reward their contribution
to the public good via in situ conservation of genetic diversity. Subsidies have several
advantages: they can be targeted exclusively to those farmers who grow traditional
varieties; they do not raise food prices to consumers; and they may prove easier to
reconcile with the current provisions of NAFTA. One problem with subsidies,
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serve genetic diversity, and not to others. Administrative corruption and lack of
information can pose serious practical difficulties in this regard.
A further drawback of subsidies, of course, is that they constitute a claim on the
public exchequer, whereas tariffs would bring in revenues. Given the fact that the
benefits of genetic diversity accrue to current and future generations worldwide, this
financial burden is one which the international community can be asked to share. One
proposal in this vein is to tax royalties from seed sales and devote the proceeds to
germplasm conservation (Barton and Christensen, 1988; National Research Council,
1993, p. 42). Such a mechanism could support in situ as well as ex situ conservation.
Whatever the choice of policy instruments-tariffs, subsidies, or  nonmarket
incentives-it should be emphasized that in situ conservation need not mean ‘freezing
the genetic landscape’ ( Iltis, 1974), much less freezing the social landscape. Many
farmers cultivate both traditional and modern varieties. Furthermore, no hard dividing
line separates the two: the evolution of ‘traditional’ varieties over time can and
sometimes does involve the incorporation of genetic material from ‘modern’ varieties.
Breeding and selection with the diversity objective in mind could produce profitable
near-traditional varieties, with a positive net effect on genetic diversity.
25 In any event,
broad-based improvements in the livelihoods and economic security of rural Mexicans
will be critical to the success of in situ conservation: if campesinos must move to the
city to survive, the micro-habitats which have been sustained by their labor will be
lost, and with them the maize varieties adapted to them.
26
International political backing, as well as financial support, is needed for Mexican
initiatives to protect genetic diversity in maize. Recent history has demonstrated that
the main domestic protagonists of traditional maize varieties – the campesinos – today
exercise little leverage over Mexican government policy. The campesinos could have
important allies internationally, however, among all those concerned with genetic
diversity’s role in world food security.
5.3 Concluding Observations
In the increasingly globalized world economy, we can no longer rest assured that
poor farmers in developing countries will underwrite the long-term well-being of
humankind by sustaining  in  situ genetic diversity in our key food crops. The
geographical isolation and political resistance of these farmers are eroding in the face
of both technological change and trade liberalization. Unless innovative policies are
implemented to reward farmers for their contributions to the public good, we cannot
expect these contributions to continue.
If the balance of power which governs social decisions were dictated by exogenous
factors beyond human agency, political economy would be a dismal science indeed.
History teaches a more hopeful lesson: people can organize to change theEcological distribution and genetic diversity  281
balance of power and thereby alter the course of events. Building international
cooperation to sustain in situ genetic diversity will put this capacity to a challenging
test. One element of the solution will be to devise ways to compensate the farmers
who perform this valuable service.
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NOTES
1. For discussions, see Daly (1993);  Chichilnisky (1994); Copeland and Taylor (1994); and
Munasinghe and Gupta (1995).
2. Templet (1995, p. 143) observes that firms which externalize costs reap ‘a subsidy, internal to the
firm, consisting of unspent pollution control dollars’; he terms this a ‘pollution subsidy.’
3. In the language of welfare economics, application of this rule yields a potential  Pareto-
improvement: with a larger pie, some people could be made better off while making no one else worse off.
In strict Paretian terms, however, the result is ‘efficient’ only if the winners actually compensate the any
losers to achieve this outcome.
4. Plant breeders rely heavily on selected ‘elite’ breeding lines for the production of new hybrids. The
traditional ‘landraces’ from the farmers’ fields provided the original genetic material in these lines, and
landraces continue to be used as the main source for introducing greater diversity into them. For
where V =the number of varieties (proxied by gene-bank accessions), A = the acreage under the crop, and
z is a parameter expressing the variety-area relationship given constant diversity. In Tables 1 and 2, z is set
to a value of 0.3, following a mathematical rule of thumb commonly used by biologists for the
species-area curve (Mann and Plummer, 1995, pp. 55-56).
6. For example, Duvick (1984, p. 176) remarks: "I reserve my most severe condemnation for those
government agencies ultimately responsible for funding of our  germplasm collections. Our national
stinginess in collecting, storing, renewing and describing the collections is inexcusable, not only in regard
to our national obligations, but also in regard to our responsibility to the entire world." See also Sun
(1986), Cohen et al. (1991), and Raeburn (1995, Ch. 2). Similar complaints have been voiced regarding the
collections of the International Agricultural Research Centers (Goodman and Castillo-Gonzales, 1991).
7. For further discussion of the need and potential for in situ conservation of crop genetic resources,
see Prescott-Allen and Prescott-Allen (1982), Altieri and Merrick (1987), and Brush (1992, 1995).282 JOURNAL OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION Vol. 6 No. 2 (1996)
8. See Bellon and Taylor (1993), Bellon and Brush (1994), Brush (1995), and Louette and Smale (1996).
9. The domestication of maize is often dated 7,000 years ago, but recent evidence has led some
paleobotanists to revise this to 4,700 years ago (Fritz, 1994). The literature on the origins of maize is reviewed by
Minc and Vandermeer (1990, pp. 81-95); for an account of the timing controversy, see Wilford (1995).
10. H. Garrison Wilkes, personal communication, 1993. The exact number is unknown, not only because no
one has attempted a complete inventory, but also because the definition of a ‘variety’ is problematic. Recent
advances in genetics make it possible to ascertain the extent to which two plants contain identical genes, but even
then a definitional problem remains: what percentage of genes must the two plants have in common to be termed
the same variety?
11. A 1994 survey of ejido maize producers found that only 35% used herbicides, insecticides, or fungicides.
For small farmers (cultivating less than 2 hectares), medium farmers (2-10 hectares), and large farmers (more than
10 hectares), the shares using any of these pesticides were 15%, 34%, and 51 %, respectively (calculated from
data reported by Secretarfa de Reforma Agraria, 1995, pp. 5.17 and 5.19).
12. Even environmentalists, who might be expected to know better, have accepted this narrow standard of
efficiency. In a recent publication of the Worldwatch Institute, for example, Kane (1995) writes that under
NAFTA, "The Mexican corn sector will be hit hard because U.S. production is more efficient, its yields far
higher."
13. Scott (1992a). Levy and van Wijnbergen (1992, p. 496) report similar figures for 1989, and note that the
price paid by urban consumers in Mexico was held below the world market price.
14. Mexican resistance to U.S. corn imports was one of the most difficult issues in the negotiation of
NAFTA’s agriculture chapter. In return for the 15-year phase-out, Mexico agreed to allow the immediate
duty-free import of up to 2 million mt of U.S. corn per year (Thurston and Negrete, 1992).
15. These subsidies include direct payments, credit programs, price supports, and  publiclyfinanced
agricultural research and extension. Based on a review of 75 separate programs available to U.S. farmers, the
Canadian government estimated U.S. corn subsidies at $50/ton (roughly $1.45/ bushel) in the mid-1980s (Clark,
1986). The U.S. Department of Agriculture (1994, p. 362) calculates that U.S. producer subsidies peaked at
$54/ton in 1987 and declined to $21/ton in 1992. Calculated producer subsidies for corn in Mexico were
higher-$122 and $113/ton in the same years-but these policies tended to raise rather than reduce market prices
(USDA, 1994, pp. 226, 233). U.S. subsidies have been further reduced in subsequent years, as have Mexican
subsidies (Browne, 1995). For U.S. corn farmers, unlike their Mexican counterparts, NAFTA provides a cushion
against the income impact of declining subsidies (Bradsher, 1992).
16. A recent World Bank study (L6pez et al., 1995) reports that ‘low capital-input’ farmers in Mexico are less
responsive to price changes (and more likely to grow principally corn) than wealthier farmers. The authors regard
this as unfortunate, and recommend policies to ‘improve the efficiency with which the sector adjusts to new
incentives.’
17. Estimates prepared for the World Bank indicated that in the first five years of NAFTA, between 145,000
and 300,000 farmers could abandon their land (DePalma, 1993). Jose Luis Calva of the National Autonomous
University of Mexico predicted that total rural out-migration, including family members, could reach 15 million
people (Calva, 1992, p. 35). For other estimates, see Levy and Wijnbergen (1991a, 1991b), Robinson et al.
(1991), and Harvey and Marblestone (1993). De Janvry, Sadoulet and Gordillo de Anda (1995) argue that likely
labor displacement has been overestimated since roughly half of  ejido maize growers do not produce market
surpluses. Even among these growers, however, some households may shift to cheap imported corn to meet
consumption needs, resulting in further contraction of maize acreage.
18. In a similar vein, Levy and van Wijnbergen (1995) advocate a program of public investment in land
improvements, notably irrigation, to offset losses to Mexican maize farmers.Ecological distribution and genetic diversity  283
19. For an ex ante analysis, see Levy and van Wijnbergen (1992).
20. For discussion of the valuation of genetic diversity, see Swanson, Pearce and Cervigni
(1994); and Swanson (1996). For a skeptical view, see Martinez-Alier (1993).
21. The 1992 Census of Agriculture placed the total market value of U.S. crop output at $75.2
billion (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1994, p. 8).
22. See, for example, Bradsher (1992). In recent years the governments of the industrialized
countries have moved to ease agricultural protection, but the reductions achieved have been modest
(see Ingco, 1995).
23. See, for example, Ray (1990). Recent efforts to endogenize trade policy have explicitly
incorporated political influence (for surveys, see Baldwin, 1989; and Hillman, 1989).
24. NAFTA Article 2101.1. For discussion, see Charnovitz (1993) and Wilkinson (1994).
25. For further discussion of policies to promote in situ conservation, see Brush (1992, 1995).
26. For an analysis of the relationship between rural depopulation and environmental degrada
tion, see Garcia-Barrios and Garcfa-Barrios (1990).
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